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The paper analyses the assignment systems and
implementation aspects of environmental regulation in regard to
water, air, and forests. The assignment of environmental functions
and its overlapping is analysed in terms of not only the different levels
of government, but also between the executive and judiciary.
Specifically, the paper examines judicial intervention in environmental
protection in India and argues that judicial activism although can be
construed as a part of “checks and balances” in a federal system, it
cannot be a substitute to the failure of executive in undertaking the
task of environmental protection. The paper also analyses the
implementation aspects of environmental policy, particularly the
effectiveness of policies and institutions relating to environmental
governance.
Despite a reasonably clear assignment system, the
implementation of environmental functions has not been satisfactory.
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In most cases, an important factor impeding effective implementation
is seen in the structure of incentives to bureaucracy and policy
makers and influence of polluters on them.  Besides, the
environmental regulators do not have access to modern technology
and inadequate resources to measure and regulate pollution levels.
The paper highlights overlapping roles of executive and
judiciary in implementing environmental regulation.  In other words,
failure of the executive to regulate and monitor pollution levels as well
as forest cover has led to the Supreme Court intervention.
Interpreting that access to clean water and air as a fundamental right,
the courts have pronounced several judgements on the
implementation of environmental regulation virtually taking over the
role of executive. This has helped to resolve the issues in the short
term and in some cases has led to the improvement in environmental
quality.  However, the solution is ad hoc as the courts cannot
undertake the task of implementation nor do they have the technical
knowledge to deal with complex problems of environmental
regulation.  Besides, technology is not static and mandating a
technical solution through a judgement such as the use of a particular
technology or particular fuel for running of commercial vehicles can
create serious problems in the long term. The solution lies in
reforming the incentive structure and institutions of governance to
make the executive much more sensitive and accountable to
environmental issues.5




An important pre-condition for satisfactory provision of public
services is the assignment of fiscal domains to, and their implementation
by different levels of government.  A clear and inextinguishable
assignment system confers ownership rights and this provides incentives
for making the necessary investments, ensures efficiency and
accountability in the provision of public services.  
Fiscal assignments however well construed and designed, do
involve overlapping, as the geographical boundaries may not coincide
with the benefits of various public services.  In part, overlapping fiscal
system is the result of vertical and horizontal competition and the
competition in turn can accentuate overlapping (Breton, 1995).
Satisfactory resolution of this is an important challenge in all multilevel
fiscal systems.  The issue is particularly relevant in the context of
environmental protection because, even the issues with local
environmental jurisdictions and applications have global implications. 
This paper analyses the assignment of environmental functions
in Indian federalism.  More specifically, it examines the assignment
system and implementation aspects pertaining to three major
components of environment, namely, water, air, and forests.  The
assignment of environmental functions and its overlapping is analysed in
terms of not only the different levels of government, but also between the
executive and judiciary.  Specifically, the paper examines judicial
intervention in environmental protection in India and argues that activism
is not a solution or a substitute to the failure of the executive in
undertaking the task of environmental protection. 6
II. The Assignment System
An important dimension of federalism is the assignment of the
power to own and manage natural resources.  Both, from the viewpoint
of principles and contemporary practices, it is difficult to discern an ideal
assignment system.  The endowment of natural resources across
regions is uneven and distributional considerations dictate against the
assignment of natural resource management to subnational
governments.  Further, exploitation of important natural resources also
involves significant inter-regional externalities and their assignment to
the subnational governments could lead to inefficient resource allocation
(Musgrave, 1983).   It could also cause significant differences in the tax
effort as the state with significant natural resources may decide to use
origin based natural resource revenues rather than destination based
taxes
1.  For this reason, Indian Constitution assigns the right to exploit
major minerals to the centre and minor minerals to the states. (Rao and
Singh, 2004.  ch. 10).
  
The Indian Constitution under Article 246, empowers the Union
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Parliament and the state legislatures to enact and implement laws
relating to activities under their domain.  The seventh schedule to the
constitution assigns the responsibilities of the two levels of government
under the “union”, “state” and “concurrent” lists.  The central and state
governments have exclusive authority over the union and state lists
respectively and both the levels have jurisdiction over the activities in the
concurrent list with the former having overriding powers. The residual
power to legislate on the subjects not covered in the three lists is
delegated to the centre by Article 248.  Article 249 empowers the centre
to legislate on any subject in the state list in the “national interest”, it can
also enact laws on state subject if two or more state legislatures consent
to such legislation (Article 252). Article 253 empowers the centre to make
laws necessary to implement treaties to which India is a signatory and
decisions of conferences of which India is a participant. Under special or
extreme situations, the centre can even dismiss a state government and
take over its governance (Article 356). These features of the constitution
show centripetal bias in the Indian constitution.  Such a backdrop of
central dominance in policy making in general has contributed to a
dominant role of central government in matters related to environmental
legislation too.7
The functions related to regulation and development of interstate
rivers and river valleys, fishing and fisheries beyond territorial water,
shipping and navigation, of inland waterways, maritime shipping and
navigation and entering agreements with foreign countries have been
assigned to the central government. The state governments are
empowered to legislate on subjects related to water supplies, irrigation
and canals, drainage and embankment, water storage and waterpower,
subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of union list, and fisheries.
Emissions from factories and shipping and navigation on inland
waterways as regards mechanically propelled vessels figure in the
concurrent list.   The assignment system in regard to air is much more
ambiguous.  Air pollution does not directly figure in any of the three lists
and have to be traced only by implications. Regulation of mines and
mineral development figures in the central list, the central government
would therefore be responsible for air pollution related to mines. Similarly
the central government is responsible for any pollution related to public
sector industries controlled by the central government. Public health and
sanitation figures in the state list, this empowers state governments to
legislate on health aspect related to pollution.  The assignment of
legislative power in regard to the protection of forests and wildlife was in
the state list till 1976, but was brought to the concurrent list by an (forty-
second) amendment of the constitution.
The third tier of government was introduced in the Indian
Constitution by the 73
rd and 74
th Amendment in 1992. The third tier is the
local government at rural and urban areas.  Rural local governments are
called Panchayats and they have been constituted at district, block, and
village levels.  The urban local governments are the municipal
corporations, municipalities and for smaller towns, Nagarapalikas.
These already existed in some states, and after the amendments, these
local bodies were conferred the constitutional status. 
The eleventh and twelfth schedules to the constitution list the
subjects to be devolved to the rural and urban local governments
respectively, but these are carried out concurrently with the state
governments.   The environmental functions listed for the rural local
governments include land improvement, land consolidation and soil
conservation, minor irrigation, water management and watershed
development, fisheries, social forestry and farm forestry, minor forest
products, drinking water, fuel and fodder, non-conventional energy
sources and maintenance of community assets.  For urban local bodies,8
the list includes subjects like water supply for domestic, industrial, and
commercial purposes; public health, sanitation, conservancy and solid
waste management; and urban forestry, protection of the environment
and promotion of ecological aspects, provision of urban amenities and
facilities such as parks, gardens, and playgrounds are listed.  
III. Environmental Regulation in India
The UN conference on Human Environment held at Stockholm in
1972 exerted major influence and has been a driving force in
environmental legislation and policy making in India. The Government of
India initiated a number of steps to implement the decisions taken at the
conference by means of amendments to the constitution, new legislation
relating to environmental protection and creation of institutions for
implementing legislation. In 1976, environmental protection and
improvement were explicitly incorporated into the constitution by the
Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act. Specific provisions were
inserted into the Directive Principles of the State Policy and Fundamental
Duties. Article 48A  which was added to the directive principles states,
“…the State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and
to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”. Article 51A(g) in a
new chapter entitled, “Fundamental Duties”, imposes a similar
responsibility on every citizen “to protect and improve natural
environment including forests, rivers, lakes and wild life and to have
compassion for living creatures.” Together these two provisions lay the
foundation for jurisprudence of environmental protection. The
amendment also expanded the list of concurrent powers by moving
“Forests” and “Protection of Wild Animals and Birds” from the state list to
the concurrent list. 
In 1972, Parliament enacted the Wild Life Protection Act prior to
the Stockholm conference. The act provides for state wildlife advisory
boards, regulations for hunting wild animals and birds, establishment of
national parks and sanctuaries, regulations for trade in wild animals, and
judicially imposed penalties for violating the act. The act is administered
by wildlife wardens and their staff. In 1972, when the act was introduced9
by the central government, wildlife was a state subject, in fact, 11 states
introduced resolutions allowing the central government to legislate under
Article 252(I) of the constitution. The move for centralisation of provisions
for wild life protection thus came from the states themselves. An
amendment to the act in 1982 allowed for capture and transportation of
wild animals for scientific management. Subsequently, another
amendment in 1991 recognised the needs of tribal and forest dwellers.
The core of early environmental legislation relates to forests. The
state played an important role in forest management since the
establishment of forest department in 1864 with the help from Germany,
the leading European nation in forest management at the time. The
colonial government immediately introduced the Indian Forest Act in
1865 and asserted propriety right of the state over forests. The act of
1865 was made further stringent in 1878 to make a comprehensive
legislation, which inter alia, transferred the ownership and management
of forest from the village level to a centralised state. The act disregarded
centuries of customary use by rural population and alienated peasant
and tribal communities. The 1878 Act was later amended to become the
Indian Forest Act, 1927, which is still in force.
The significant central government intervention in the post-
independence era was seen in the enactment of The Forest
(Conservation) Act in 1980 to prevent the alarming rate of deforestation
and the consequent ecological imbalance and environmental
degradation by assigning a supervisory role for the central government.
The act was amended in 1988, it provides for the approval of the central
government if a state decides to de-reserve a reserved forest, use forest
land for non-farm purposes, assign forest land to a private corporation
and clears forest land for the purpose of reforestation. 
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 was
the first important environmental legislation in India. The constitution
does not unambiguously place water either as a state subject or as a
union subject. The history and the preamble of the Water Act suggest
that only state governments can enact water pollution legislation. During
the decade long deliberations that preceded the introduction of the
legislation in the Parliament, twelve states passed enabling resolutions
urging the centre to legislate on the subject since it involved inter-state
externalities.10
This act paved the way for creation of Central Pollution Control
Boards (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Boards (SPCB).  It confers
regulatory authority in state boards and empowers them to establish and
enforce effluent standards for factories discharging wastewater into the
water bodies. The central board performs these functions for union
territories and coordinates activities among the states. These boards
play advisory role for the respective governments on matters related to
location of industries and any matter related to control of pollution. The
CPCB is vested with the responsibility of collecting, compiling and
publishing data on water pollution and disseminate information related to
treatment and disposal of sewage. It also has the mandate to carry out
and sponsor investigation and research on pollution abatement.  The
boards were empowered to enforce the act through criminal prosecution
and injunctions to restrain polluters. Later, the act was amended in 1988
to bolster the enforcement machinery by giving them powers to close
defaulting industrial plants or withdraw the supply of power and water by
an administrative order. 
The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981 was
enacted under Article 253 to implement the decision taken at the United
Nations Conference on Human Environment held at Stockholm in 1972.
The act expanded the authority of the CPCB and SPCBs established
under the Water Act to include problems of air pollution also. The states
not having a water pollution board were required to set up an air pollution
board. The boards were required to prescribe emission standards for
industry and automobiles after taking into account the ambient air quality
standards. They were also required to issue permit to industries
operating in designated air pollution control areas. To strengthen its
enforcement, the act was amended in 1987 to introduce stiffer penalties
and empowering the boards to penalise the defaulting plants to close
operation on exceeding the emission standards, if necessary.
The  Environment Protection Act of 1986  was enacted in the
wake of the Bhopal gas tragedy. It is an umbrella legislation designed to
provide a framework for the central government to coordinate the
activities of various central and state authorities created under the Water
Act and Air Act. It delegates wide powers to the executive to enable
bureaucrats to frame necessary rules and regulations. The provision of
this act and subordinate rules can override any other law. A broad rule
making power was conferred on the central government; it was
authorised to take all measures that it deemed necessary for the purpose11
of protecting the environment. Some of these measures included setting
new national standards for improving the quality of environment,
standards for controlling emissions and effluent discharges, to locate
industrial sites, and to establish safeguards for preventing accidents.
The central government enacted the Public Liability Insurance
Act in 1991 to provide immediate relief to victims of accidents involved in
handling hazardous substances. The act requires the owner to
compensate the victims irrespective of any neglect or default. The
principal authority to administer the act is the District Collector. The act
obligates every owner to take an insurance policy covering potential
liability from accidents. Every owner was also required to contribute in
toto an Environmental Relief Fund established by the central
government.  The act was amended in 1992 to introduce provisions
relating to the fund and to place a cap of Rs. 450 million (about 10 million
US$). The National Environmental Tribunal Act of 1995  builds on the
Public Liability Insurance Act of 1991 for providing relief to victims of
accidents involving hazardous substances. The act empowers the
central government to establish a national tribunal at New Delhi with
powers to entertain applications for compensation, enquire into such
claims and make an award determining the compensation to be paid.
The act imposes a bar on all civil courts from entertaining any claim that
may be dealt with by the tribunal. An award may be challenged in the
Supreme Court or impugned in a petition to the High Court.
The  National Environment Appellate Authority Act of 1997
requires the central government to constitute a national environment
appellate authority for hearing appeals against orders granting
environmental clearance in areas where restrictions are imposed on
setting up any industry or carrying on any operation or process.
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IV. Centralisation and Decentralisation in   Indian
Environmental Politics
Political factors have impacted on environmental issues to
influence laws, regulations, acts, court orders, directives, conventions
and formulation and implementation of policies and programmes.  In12
particular, swings between centralisation and decentralisation of political
power have impacted on the control and use of natural resource like
water, air, forests, and species of animals used in economic activities like
agriculture and industry. The attempt here is to trace the forces of
centralisation and decentralisation at various levels of governance:
national, provincial, regional, and local. Table 1 tries to capture these
aspects in a structured manner. It tries to look at the aspect of industrial
pollution, ecosystem protection, agriculture, forests and implementation,
and enforcement of related action plans at various levels of governance.
In regard to industrial pollution, the impact of air pollution is
global and hence, we see the formation of global protocol limiting CFCs
and greenhouse gases. The protocol has been implemented in India by
the national government through the Air Act. The regulation of local air
pollution due to vehicular use and industrial emission has come mainly
from the intervention of NGOs and Public Interest Litigations (PILs)
4 in
the Supreme Court. With respect to water pollution the implications are
inter-jurisdictional since it has spillover effects. The states in India
voluntarily asked for national law in such case. At the local level too there
have been PILs against pollution of local water bodies.13
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The case of agriculture and the issue of water use seem vexed
and potentially volatile. There are big irrigation and river valley projects
and dams and command area development projects mainly controlled by
the central government and in some cases, state governments.  The
sharing of river water has been a volatile issue involving property rights,
bargaining power and with inter-jurisdictional implications.  Despite
legislating central acts and establishment of tribunals, solution to the
problem has been elusive and many states in India are engaged in bitter
fights.  In more recent years, however, the attempt has been to
encourage decentralised systems and the political power has shifted to
the water users’ associations and watershed development projects with a
distinct local level component in planning and participation.  This has
resulted in a paradigm shift to management by pressure groups at local
levels.  
Deforestation is a massive problem in India where the resource
is controlled and managed by the state governments. Nexus between
contractors, politicians, and bureaucrats has become rampant in
exploiting the resource, the trend is combined with population pressure,
which needs forest products but is alienated from the upkeep of the
forest. The recent initiative in decentralised control with the introduction
of joint forest management between the people and the government and
the formation of village forest committees has met with some degree of
success, however.
With regard to implementation and enforcement of regulations,
the Supreme Court has been extremely active forcing governments at
the central and state level to implement some of the regulations formed
by the governments themselves by responding to PILs. The pollution
control boards mandated environmental impact assessment for certain
categories of industries to strengthen the regulations to control industrial
pollution.  The role of specialised agencies set up to regulate
environment as also the role of the judiciary in monitoring the
implementation of laws are discussed in greater detail below.15
V. Environmental Regulation in India: Forests
  Evolution of Policy   
The colonial administration declared the proprietary rights of the
state over forests, and it was subsequently determined to what extent
these were limited by legally existing rights of private persons or
communities. After independence in 1947, the Government of India
made no substantive changes to this administrative structure. The state
retained exclusive control over the management and protection of forest
resources. The principles, which were to guide the forest policy of
independent India, were enunciated in the National Forest Policy of
1952. The policy reiterated the principles of colonial forestry, as
enshrined in the earlier forest policy resolution of 1894, and reinforced
the exclusive rights of the state with regard to the management and
control of forest resources.  A goal was adopted for bringing 60 percent
of the area in hilly tracts and 20 percent of the area in plains (one-third of
the country's total geographical area) under forest cover for ecological
reasons.
Assignment of Powers
The Indian Forest Act of 1927 provides the core of regulations and
institutions governing forest management and preservation.  In essence,
control of forests has resided with state governments.  The state
governments have appointed forest officers, a cadre of state bureaucracy,
as on-the-ground implementers of forest management. A ‘Secretary’ who
belongs to the administrative cadre heads the state forest administration.
He is assisted by the conservators of forests belonging to the ‘Indian Forest
Service’ who are technically more competent to manage forests as
compared to the officers belonging to the administrative cadre. At the
district level the District Forest Officer (DFO) is the administrative head,
below him there are Range Officers (RO) who administer the forests in
different ranges of districts. These officers have often functioned relatively
autonomously, and their ability to control the use of the natural resource
without adequate monitoring has allowed them to engage in rent seeking
(Wade, 1988).  Thus, collusion between state forest officers, contractors
and logging companies is acknowledged to be widespread, to the detriment
of forest preservation.16
The Forest (Conservation) Act was passed in 1980, which gave the
central government the power to control. State governments’ decision to
divert forest area for non-forest uses. The administrative centralisation
required a recasting of the responsibilities and duties of some of the
departments of the central government that were responsible for forest
planning. The Director General of Forests (DGF) is the administrative head
of the forest and wildlife related issues of the Union Ministry of Environment
and Forest (MoEF).  
There are three divisions supervised by the DGF, two of these
relate to forest conservation and the third one is for wild life protection. One
division is headed by Additional Director General of Forest (of forest service
cadre) and the division coordinates its conservation programme through
seven regional offices, each headed by a Chief Conservator of Forests.
Other functions of the division are to formulate policies, conduct surveys,
conduct training programmes and undertake research and documentation.
The Indian Council for Forest Research and Education (ICFRE) has been
set up to facilitate research and documentation and use of scientific
knowledge for preservation of forest and wild life. The council has set up
several institutes to conduct its research activities. The forest conservation
department addresses the problem of deforestation and land use changes. 
The second division supervises conservation and is headed by an
Additional Secretary (of administrative service cadre); this division also
administers various other conservation programmes in addition to forests
(like wetland, biodiversity etc.). The Additional Secretary reports to the DGF
for forest conservation (called eco-development and regeneration
programmes) related issues and to Secretary in the Ministry for all other
conservation programmes. The third department under the DGF
administers the protection of wild life and maintains zoos and national
parks.
The multiple actors and plethora of bureaucracy at both central and
state levels with a mix of generalists and those with specialised knowledge
of forestry described above has not helped in the conservation of forest
cover.  The central bureaucracy formulates policies often, without proper
understanding of ground realities owing to its remoteness.   Again,
uniformity in policies may not be appropriate in a large and diverse country
like India. The state bureaucracy has to deal with the central directives
besides its own rules and regulations.  It is also constrained by the nexus of
contractors and politicians and often, become a part of the axis.  Thus, the17
coordination cost of forest conservation has been high and not surprisingly,
the policies and institutions have led to steady decline in the forest cover in
the country.  
The central government introduced the Forest (Conservation) Act
in 1980 in response to high rate of deforestation. The act required that the
state governments would have to obtain prior permission from a central
committee in the Ministry called Forest Advisory Committee, headed by the
DGF, for conversion of forest land. Thus, the government’s response to the
declining forest cover has been to centralise decision making through
increased monitoring and control.  However, the deforestation problems
were not due to non-optimal decisions by state governments.  The problem
lies in the structure of incentives to the state level bureaucrats and their
incapacity to prevent quasi-legal or illegal logging activities or connivance
with the contractors.  In such cases increased central control would do
nothing to tackle the root cause.  Instead, more effective local monitoring
through community and local government involvement, would be an
appropriate policy response.  Thus, it is not suprising that the act failed to
check deforestation and the government finally had to opt for a
decentralised governance structure by involving communities for forest
protection and creating the institution of joint forest management in 1990.
Stakeholders in the Forest Sector of India 
Role of Central and State Governments: The transfer of “forest and 
wildlife” from the state list to concurrent list in the constitution has given the
central government overriding powers in formulating policies and promoting
and coordinating programmes. The Ministry of Environment and Forests
formulates overall policy framework. However, implementation of measures
to protect forests is the responsibility of the states.  Besides, as revenue
from forests accrue to the state governments, the interests of the central
and the state governments do not necessarily coincide, and the centre is
arguably able to take a more long-term view. Politically, the centre
responds to groups that are well represented in the national capital,
particularly, conservationists, international agencies, and voluntary groups
have a considerable influence on the direction of policy at this level.
The responsibility for forest protection, management, and utilisation
rests with the states.   The constitution also assigns the revenues from the18
forests to the state governments.  Being closer to decision makers, regional
and local interests influence formulation and implementation of regulatory
policies on sustainable forestry.  Furthermore, interest of revenue could
result in poor enforcement of regulations relating to the protection of forests.
These have led to judicial interventions, which will be discussed below.
Other Stakeholders: An important institution for the regulation and
development of forests is the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy consists of
field level officials of the State Forest Departments and decision-makers at
the policy level. They are responsible for the day-to-day management of
state forests, and has maximum direct interaction with user groups. They
have enjoyed considerable freedom of action in implementation because
existing forest legislation gives them a great deal of discretionary control
over the flow of benefits from state forests. However, in some case
interference by politicians considerably constrains their ability to act
independently (Vira, 1995).
Within rural society, it is possible to distinguish groups by the
extent and nature of their dependence upon natural resources. The
dependence of medium and large land owning groups on common
resources is typically mediated through the market. Small and marginal
farmers and the landless rural resource users depend on local commons
for subsistence needsfuel, fodder, food, and basic construction timber. 
Other stakeholders include manufacturers of forest-based
products and contractors.  Restrictions on logging has made forest
based industry unviable.  At the same time, forest contractors have been
a strong force in preventing its effective implementation. Trade in non-
timber forest products (NTFP) has been controlled by private contractors,
who on the one hand depress wages to subsistence groups to make
large profits, and on the other exploit both the forests and indigenous
people living in forest. Despite the pronouncements by the National
Forest Policy Resolution, 1952 and reiteration by various policy
pronouncements including Plan documents, contractors remain an
exploitative force in forestry operations due to their strong political links
and connivance with forest bureaucracy. (Guha, 1983).   
The Forest Act allows the state to delegate the management of
some forests, designated in such cases as village forests, to village
community organisations.  In practice, the weakness of local government
institutions has meant that such assignments were very limited, or19
useless in effect.  While this situation may change in the long run, with
the strengthening of local governments (Wade, 1988, ch. 13), it will
require state governments’ decision-makers (politicians and bureaucrats)
give up significant source of rents.  As documented by Wade (1988) in
the case of irrigation, different levels of the bureaucracy and political
structures also collude, and share the rents acquired from those who are
given access to the resource (water or trees, as the case may be).
Features of Decentralisation
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The increasing depletion of India's forest resources has brought
into sharp focus the inherent inadequacy of traditional state-owned and
operated systems of forest management in sustaining the forest resource
base against the growing human and livestock population pressures,
industrialisation, and urbanisation.  Apart from developmental pressures,
the dependence of forest user groups is a crucial factor in the state of
India’s forests. Forest conservation priorities cannot be determined in
isolation from local people and broader patterns of natural resource use,
and this must be complimented by policies promoting sustainable and
equitable development of the natural resource base as a whole.  In
acknowledging this factor, the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Government of India issued policy guidelines for the involvement of
village communities and voluntary agencies in the regeneration of
degraded forest lands on June 1, 1990 under the JFM (joint forest
management) programme.
 Under the JFM programme, the user (local communities) and
the owner (government) manage the resource and share the cost. The
effective and meaningful involvement of local communities in evolving
sustainable forest management systems allows the use of indigenous
knowledge about different aspects of conservation.  It is well known that
rural people particularly women and indigenous tribes (also referred to as
tribals), have intimate knowledge of species, their growth, utility and
medicinal value. The linking of incentives and participatory forest
development has been singularly instrumental in eliciting community
participation.. Currently, it is estimated that 10.24 million hectares of
forest land are being managed under the JFM programme through
36,075 village forest committees (VFCs) in 22 states.. 
Following the launching of the JFM programme in India in the
last decade, several issues of importance have emerged like the20
diversity in institutional and benefit-sharing arrangements, development
of technology and silvicultural practices to increase the productivity of
degraded forests, etc. In the current arrangement people’s needs have
taken centrestage. As a result silvicultural practices and technologies
now need to be oriented to not only increasing forest productivity but also
to the management of NTFP (non-timber forest products), fodder, and
fuel-wood. 
A review of the institutional and benefit-sharing arrangements
across states that have implemented JFM has caused some serious
concerns.  These include inadequate funds and arbitrary allocation of the
available funds, inadequate personnel to supervise, lack of coordination
between the administration and field staff, non-existence of a structure of
governance to coordinate the working of VFCs with other departments to
avoid a multiplicity of committees within a village.  The functioning of
these committees under the panchayats (local governments) is also not
well defined. Thus, existing legal and policy provisions relating to forests,
revenue lands, rights and concessions, customary laws, traditional rights,
resolution of conflicts and coordination between rural local governments
and JFM lacks a clear framework. There are also a plethora of
ambiguous and often conflicting resolutions, laws, policies, and acts.
This leads to ambiguities and uncertainties, creates scope for
supersession on the basis of legal technicalities. Certainly, greater
coordination efforts are required among rural development and forest
ministries of the state and central governments.
  Despite a reasonably successful attempt in introducing
decentralised and participatory management of forests thorough JFM,
the success of the programme depends on the way in which the forest
department and more particularly, the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO)
exercises his powers. In fact, the role assigned to the DFO is pivotal in
the initiation and success of the JFM programme. With powers to
disband a badly functioning committee, cancel membership, and
nominate NGOs for membership, the relationship has been criticised to
be unequal and the actual power seem to be retained by the state
bureaucracy.  It must also be mentioned that the JFM has been launched
only in areas where natural forests are already lost and local
communities require help to restore forest cover and achieve (or regain)
a more sustainable forest management system. Ironically this has meant
that those communities which have not significantly depleted their forests
do not qualify for the programme. 21
In many areas, indigenous people have felt excluded from JFM
because opportunities to participate have been monopolised by higher
caste and elite groups who have been able to use their greater access to
officials to secure participation in the JFM scheme. The marginalised and
technically landless groups like the tribal peoples have thus seen
'degraded lands' and 'wastelands' that were important to their livelihoods
annexed to JFM, leaving them further impoverished.
Intervention of the Judiciary
Despite recent efforts to increase forest cover through
reforestation, there has been considerable depletion of the forest cover
in India, and at present, the forest cover comprises less than 18 percent
of total land area. The actual forest area with crown density is only about
11 percent. Despite legilslations and allocation of financial resources, the
forest area of the country instead of showing an increase has continued
to deteriorate. According to the State of the Forest Report, 1997,
between 1995 and 1997 more than 17,000 square kilometers of forest
land was lost. Concerned with the rapid depletion of forest cover
throughout the country, the Supreme Court in 1996 directed that all
''ongoing activities in any forest in any state`` should be stopped
forthwith. It said no activity should be carried out without the prior
permission of the central government under section 2 of the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980.  Every state was directed to ensure immediate
compliance of the direction and report to the court within two months. 
As regards tropical rain forests in Arunachal Pradesh in the
districts of Tirap and Changlang, a complete ban on felling of trees was
imposed. A complete ban (with the exception of defence and other
government purposes) was also imposed on the movement of trees and
timber from any north eastern state to any other state. In 1998 the
Supreme Court gave detailed order on pricing of timber, licensing, forest
protection, management of forests, wood based industries and possible
action against officials for neglecting duty or indulging in corrupt
practices. The court instructed all the states with rich reserve of forest on
the steps to be implemented to check deforestation (Shyam Divan and
Armin Rosencranz, 2001)
However, the decision of the Supreme Court has placed
hardships on a number of state governments both in reducing the22
revenue earnings and in constraining forest resource based economic
activity,  many thought these ad hoc measures are fraught with danger,
they can spin out of control unless the procedures are institutionalised
and governed by suitably formulated laws and policies.
The court’s action has been effective in producing results. The
latest statistics from the State of the Forest Report actually show a net
increase in the forest cover by 3,896 sq..km in the forest area
assessment held between 1997 and 1999 and a further increase of
38,245 sq. km between 1999 and 2001.Nevertheless, the appropriate
course of action seems to be to have a sustainable plan for forestry
rather than persist with blanket bans.
VI. Environmental Regulation in India: Water
Evolution of Policy
The first national policy on water was formulated in 1987.
The government felt that as the country prepared itself to enter the
21
st century, effect to develop, conserve, utilise, and manage water
resource have to be guided by national perspectives. The policy
makers realised that water is a scarce and precious national
resource that needs to be planned, developed and conserved as
such, and on an integrated and environmentally sound basis,
keeping in view the needs of the growing population. The second
national policy on water was formulated in 2002. The two national
policies dealt with all-important aspects of water usage,
conservation, and regulation.
The Assignment System
As discussed earlier, the responsibility of developing and
managing the water resources has been distributed among the central,
state and local governments in India. These responsibilities have been
further delegated to different ministries, their departments, agencies, and
commissions. The Union Ministry of Water Resources formed in 1985 is
in charge of overall planning, policy formulation, coordination and23
guidance, development and regulation of water resource in the country.
Prior to 1985 the focus on water related issues were mainly on irrigation,
command area development, flood control, and ground water
exploration.  The formation of the ministry gave a new thrust to
programmes on water and a comprehensive policy was developed for
the first time in 1987.
The functions of Water Resources Ministry overlap with several
other ministries since water has multidimensional aspects and uses. The
Water Resources Ministry has to coordinate with the Ministry of
Agriculture for the development of watersheds
6 and drip and sprinkler
irrigation systems. The Central Water Commission in the Water
Resources Ministry has to maintain close technical links with the Ministry
of Power for the development of hydroelectricity. In matters related to
water pollution, the Ministry has to coordinate with the Ministry of
Environment & Forests and the Central Pollution Control Board since
these organisations are responsible for maintaining the quality of water.
The ministries of Rural Development and Environment and Forest also
have programmes for watershed development. In addition, the Ministry of
Rural Development is responsible for a “Million Wells Scheme” under
which development of ground water is taken up. The National Drinking
Water Mission is also under the Ministry of Rural Development and it is
responsible for developing the source of drinking water in rural areas.
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The Ministry of Industry is concerned with the planning and development
of water resources for industrial use, Ministry of Urban Development for
drinking water in urban areas, and the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research is responsible for research on water management techniques.
The Ministry of Water Resources, being the nodal agency on issues
related to water, needs to closely coordinate with all these ministries to
ensure maximum utility from water use. 
The involvement of multiple agencies for administering water use
requires a well-coordinated system of governance. The Ministry of Water
Resources, which is the nodal agency, has a Secretary as its
administrative head. He has several commissioners below him looking
after various departments like policy planning, projects, Indus Water
Treaty, command area development and water management, matters
related to eastern rivers, hydrology projects and minor irrigation. The
Secretary is also assisted by a financial and a coordination and
evaluation advisor.24
There are other organisations in the Water Resources Ministry
which have been delegated responsibilities related to important aspects.
These are (i) Central Water Commission, a premier technical
organisation in the country in the field of water resources and is charged
with the general responsibilities of initiating, developing, and coordinating
schemes for control, conservation and utilisation of water resources for
purposes of flood control, irrigation, navigation, drinking water supply and
water power development in consultation with the state governments; (ii)
The National Water Development Agency was set up in 1980 to promote
scientific development for optimum utilisation of water resources and for
preparing feasibility reports for inter-basin transfer of water; (iii)  The
Central Ground Water Board is entrusted with the responsibilities of
hydrogeological surveys, exploration, assessment, development and
management of ground water resources. In addition to these national
level organisations, there are river boards to look after specific river
basins. Organisations such as Water and Power Consultancy Services
(India) Limited and National Projects Construction Corporations Limited,
provide technical services for development of water resources.
Institutions like National Institute of Hydrology, Central Soil and Materials
Research Station provide scientific inputs on water development.
As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the constitutional
provisions some aspects of water use, regulation and development are
under the charge of the state governments. They implement two types of
schemes, those with a 100 percent grant from central government and
those in which the states share the cost. Within States the Department of
Irrigation is in charge of developing and maintaining irrigation projects as
well as groundwater development. The departments of panchayati raj
(local government) and rural development, the departments of
environment and forests and science and technology and the
departments of agriculture implement watershed development
programmes. In addition the department of finance and planning
oversees the work of the remote sensing agencies in different states,
which is in charge of investigating and proposing areas in the states for
water management, afforestation etc.
Historically, government institutions have been formed on
departmental lines rather than a coordinated vision of resource
development. They follow narrow sectoral objectives without reference to
other departments working in same area and related sectors. Most state
departments of agriculture do not deal with water at all even though25
agriculture consumes largest volume of water. Further, there seems to
be disjunction of institutional responsibility between state and local
governments. In many states, the institutions related to watershed based
poverty alleviation programmes or drought prone area programmes do
not have any local presence and the involvement of local people does
not exist.
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Another major problem in development and regulation of water
resources is the plethora of bureaucracy to administer various aspects of
water resources management involving heavy coordination cost. A
Secretary heads the irrigation department of the state governments. He
is assisted by a number of bureaucrats including the director of
groundwater who is usually a hydrologist or a geologist. The irrigation
projects at the state level are headed by a chief engineer, who delegates
responsibilities to the Superintendent Engineers functioning at the district
level. The Superintendent Engineer is advised by a District Irrigation
Advisory Committee headed by the District Collector, who is the chief
administrator of the district.  At the village level (where there are existing
irrigation structures or new ones being initiated) there is usually a
departmental worker who liaisons with the water users’ associations
(which is an elected body of the village) and report to the works inspector
belonging to the engineering department.
At the state, district, and village levels, several departments are
involved in water resource management. At the state level, the Secretary
from Panchyati Raj ministry supervises water conservation missions,
rural water supply, and minor irrigation. The State Pollution Control
Boards are responsible for monitoring water pollution and quality. The
Department of Forest and Environment implements afforestation and
watershed projects. The state remote sensing agencies which collect
data on the availability of water, investigate and propose new areas for
water management.
At the district level the District Collector is the Chairperson of
District Irrigation Advisory Committee and is also the Chairperson of the
District Watershed Advisory Committee.  He/She is assisted by a Project
Director implementing projects related to watershed development. The
Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishads (District Legislative
Assemblies) sanctions funds for rural water supply networks and these
are constructed and maintained by the engineering department of the
district headed by a Superintendent Engineer. All districts usually have26
an Environmental Officer functioning under the directive of the State
Pollution Control Board on matters related to water pollution.
In the villages, there are Gram Panchayats (village local
governments) with an elected head called sarpanch  who is also the
chairman of the water conservation and utilisation committees,
watershed committees/associations. Many states have community
facilitators, social mobilises and common interest groups working in
coordination with the Gram Panchayats. Some villages also have elected
water user’s associations working directly with the works inspectors of
the irrigation department of the states.
Thus, on paper the assignment of environmental power in Indian
federalism is reasonably clear.   Broadly, while the central government
has the responsibility of determining the overall policy frame, the
subnational governments are involved in implementation.  Thus, the
assignment system attempts to minimise transaction costs by providing
sufficient scope for decentralised governance of environmental functions.
However, the implementation of environmental functions has been a major
concern. In most cases, a critical factor impeding effective implementation
is the structure of incentives to bureaucracy and policymakers and
influence of politicians on them.  Besides, the environmental regulators do
not have access to modern technology and the resources with them are
inadequate.
Issues in the Water Sector: Coordination Failures
Inter State River Water Disputes:  A close scrutiny of Indian
waterdispute settlement mechanisms shows that these are ambiguous
and opaque.  The problems are compounded by the entanglement of
inter-state water disputes with more general centre-state conflicts, and
with everyday political issues. These impacts can be reduced by a more
efficient design of negotiating mechanisms. However, as large areas of
India are relatively arid, water is critical to the welfare of the country's
citizens and obviously, evokes a lot of emotions.  
Because India is a federal democracy, and because rivers cross
state boundaries, instituting efficient and equitable mechanisms for
allocating river flows has long been an important legal and constitutional
issue.  Numerous inter-state river-water disputes have erupted since27
independence.  An example of the intensity of conflict relating to Cauvery
river water involving the southern states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
may be seen from the following incident:
“A farmer jumped to his death into the Kabini reservoir on
Wednesday (September 18, 2002) to protest against Karnataka’s
decision to release Cauvery waters into Tamil Nadu.” …..As news
spread … spontaneous protest marches were held with 300 farmers
courting arrest in Mandya” (www.rediff.com, September 19, 2002.    
This particular dispute continues to remain unresolved and no
solution acceptable to all the parties seems possible within the existing
arrangement.  
The phenomenon of inter-state water disputes in India is still
relatively less understood.  Part of the difficulty is the plethora of actors and
the complexity of the institutional environment within which the various
parties reach (or fail to reach) agreement.  Actors include state
governments (which in turn must be decomposed into professional
politicians, political parties, and interest groups), the national parliament,
central ministries, the courts, and ad hoc water tribunals.   In general, river-
water disputes have involved state and central politicians, as well as the
courts and special tribunals and commissions set up to arbitrate.  Although
fairly explicit constitutional provisions govern inter-state river waters, it is
unclear precisely whether existing mechanisms for adjudicating interstate
water disputes are adequate.  Indeed, there is growing consensus that
existing institutions are increasingly unable to generate acceptable
outcomes that contribute to economic growth and national welfare.  
Numerous inter-state riverwater disputes have erupted in India
since independence. The disputes persist even as they have proved costly
and the existing dispute resolution mechanisms are ambiguous, opaque
and in many cases flawed (Rao and Singh, 2004).  In a cooperative
bargaining framework water can be shared efficiently, with compensating
transfers as necessary, if initial water rights are well-defined, and if
institutions to facilitate and implement cooperative agreements are in place.
However, when the initial allocation of rights is at stake and where the
parties face a situation of pure conflict rather than one of potential gains
from trade, a search for a negotiated solution may be futile, and quick
movement to arbitration or adjudication may be more efficient.  However, in28
the Indian case, not only is this process slow, but also effective binding
arbitration does not exist.
  
Water and Indian Federalism:  Indian institutions for water-dispute
resolution are ambiguous and opaque.  State governments dominate the
allocation of river waters.  The Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 was
legislated to deal with conflicts, and included provisions for the
establishment of tribunals to adjudicate where direct negotiations have
failed.  However, states have sometimes refused to accept the decisions of
tribunals, so arbitration is not binding.  Significantly, the courts have also
been ignored occasionally.  The centre has sometimes intervened but in
most complicated cases, it has been not succeeded.  In short, an effective
institutional mechanism for settling inter-state water disputes does not exist.  
The relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution are (i) Entry 17
in the state list, (ii) Entry 56 in the union list, and (iii) Article 262.
Essentially, Indian federalism with a strong centripetal bias has
consistently involved coalition building.  This has meant a high level of
explicit or implicit "horse-trading" among the centre and states that are
potentially key elements of a central coalition
.  One possible
interpretation, therefore, is that the centre wishes to preserve a system,
which allows it flexibility or discretion in bargaining over centre-state
issues in general, with water being one of them.  A related feature of
Indian political economy is the problem of multiple vetoes (Bardhan,
1984;  see  also Singh, 1997), which would help explain why, with
discretion preserved, it may not be used decisively.  This, too, seems
relevant to the case of water, where negotiations have dragged on, and
where the central government has sometimes prolonged them, by failing
to speedily appoint a tribunal, even when asked.
Disenchantment with the adjudication process for inter-state river
disputes led to several attempts at change.  First, the National Water
Development Agency was created in July 1982, to "carry out the water
balance and other studies...for optimum utilisation of water resources..."
(National Water Development Agency, 1992).  This is an institution set
up by the Government of India without any statutory backing.
Furthermore, its scope is technical, and separate from the institutional
realities of water allocation.  Second, in 1983, the National Water
Resources Council was created by a central government resolution.  Its
composition includes chief ministers of states, lieutenant governors of29
union territories, several central government ministers, and the Prime
Minister as chairman.  This group met first in October 1985, and adopted
a National Water Policy in 1987. Unfortunately, however,
disenchantment with the adjudicative process for inter-state river
disputes has continued. 
In summary, the resolution of water disputes is complicated by
being tangled in the general difficulties of centre-state federal issues.
The wide scope for discretion, the extensive bargaining, and the
multiplicity of potential vetoes work in tandem to undermine the clarity
and transparency needed for speedy dispute resolution.  In May 2002,
the ISWD Act was amended to try to place time limits on tribunals:
Analytical Foundations of Water Disputes: Economic analysis
offers helpful guidance to understanding the problems of inter-state
water disputes.  Admittedly, water has a number of features that create
potential market failure.  These may include non-rivalry, non-
excludability, externalities, merit good features, and significant
transactions costs (Richards and Singh, 2001).  The presence of these
factors means that although increased reliance on market forces (e.g.,
one state selling water to another) can contribute significantly to
resolving water issues, there is no escape from the need for parties to
agree upon a set of rules, an enforcement mechanism, and a prior
distribution of property rights.  
Property rights have been claimed on the basis of historical use,
as well as on the basis of the Harmon Doctrine, that "what falls on our
roof is ours to use, without regard to any potential harm to downstream
parties".  Historical use can work against trading water rights, while the
Harmon Doctrine ignores externalities as well as past investments
connected with water use.  A third approach, that of the social contract a
la Thomas Hobbes, holds more promise.  A deal must be struck among
the existing decision-making entities, such as Indian states, which (i)
decides on an initial allocation of property rights and (ii) creates a
mechanism to trade these rights, to regulate uses that generate
externalities, etc.  Consequently, institutions that support efficient
bargaining and can enforce binding agreements are essential.
The obvious starting point for thinking about bargaining over
water is the Coasian perspective (Coase, 1960).  Coase’s ideal
bargaining solution provides a benchmark against which one can30
compare reality.  The main lesson of Coase is that one should not
presume that central intervention is desirable or necessary in inter-state
water disputes.  Indeed, when the essential problem faced by states or
groups within a state is that the initial allocation of water is sub-optimal
due to changing circumstances, cooperative bargaining will lead to an
optimal allocation.  However, there are (at least) three situations in which
bilateral or multilateral bargaining among concerned state governments
may not be efficient or equitable on their own.  
•  When the centre can affect starting positions or threat points in
the bargaining game between states.
•  When there is incomplete information, even imperfect central
intervention can be better in expected terms than bilateral
bargaining.  There are potentially two kinds of information:
technical and subjective.  In principle, technical information may
be shared and verified, but in practice this can be very time-
consuming, and contribute to lengthy proceedings, as is typical
of Indian water tribunals.  Complicating matters further is the way
costs and benefits are truly evaluated subjectively is often not
objectively verifiable.  When a rival’s objectives are unclear,
bargaining becomes far more difficult.
•  When there are multiple issues to be bargained over, there may
be spillovers to non-riparian states. 
An additional complication is that the productivity of a given
quantity of water depends on the level of complementary investments
(Richards and Singh, 1996,).  These may include dams, irrigation
projects, or even more general complementary investments in
agriculture.  The first thing to note is that as long as the benefit from a
given amount of water is dependent on the amount of investment, the
optimal allocation of water will depend on the investments in both states.
Hence, even though there are no direct externalities as a result of the
investment, the conditional optimum of water allocation involves a
linkage of both states.  What state A does with its investment will affect
the optimal amount of water that state B should receive.  This was an
important ingredient of the Cauvery dispute.
This analysis assumes that property rights over water are well
specified and clearly understood.  But this may not actually be the case.
In fact, much of the conflict or disagreement over inter-state river waters
in India as an attempt to influence or determine the initial allocation of31
property rights over water, is by methods such as political lobbying.  The
initial quantities of water are not given, but are precisely the main subject
of negotiations.  In some cases, there is a de facto allocation of rights
based on historical usage, but there is a surplus of currently unutilised
water that can be used (often only if appropriate investments are made)
once it is unambiguously allocated.  It is critical to recognise that in such
cases, the situation is one of pure conflict: more for one party means less
for another when there is a given total amount of the resource. 
In India it is specified that if negotiations fail, a tribunal must be
appointed.  However, this is done at the discretion of the centre and, in
the above situation, the centre would actually prefer a political solution,
where it barters an award for political support.  Reducing discretion, such
as specifying short time limits for negotiation, with a tribunal to take over
thereafter, is essential in such a situation. 
Groundwater:  Nearly 85 percent of groundwater exploited is
used only for irrigation. Besides, groundwater is now the source of four-
fifths of the domestic water supply in rural areas, and around half that of
urban and industrial areas. Further, in drought years, it is the
predominant source of irrigation.  Not surprisingly, the overuse of
groundwater is emerging as a major concern. A burgeoning population is
overdrawing aquifers in several states. The latest data indicates that in
the states of Punjab, Haryana and some urban areas water tables are
falling by up to 1 metre per year.  Although at the national level, only 30
percent of the actual groundwater potential has been harnessed, in
states such as Punjab, against a critical level of 80 percent, the level of
exploitation is over 98 percent. Haryana is a close second at 80 percent,
and Tamil Nadu is reaching criticality at 60 percent.  Within states there
are pockets that have reached a very critical condition with respect to
groundwater utilisation, sometimes exceeding 100 percent. Large cities
like Ahmedabad, Jodhpur, and Chennai support thriving private
groundwater businesses that draw water from tubewells in the
neighbouring hinterlands for supply to high-income residential areas,
because groundwater tables in the cities are falling at a rate of 7-10 feet
per year. Besides depletion, pollution of aquifers through human activity
constitutes another major problem. 
Most groundwater structures are privately owned, and therefore,
are outside the purview of direct state regulation. Measures to regulate
groundwater extraction chiefly through restrictions on credit or electricity32
have had limited impact. On the contrary, wherever the water table is
high, affluent farmers use diesel pumps if electricity is in short supply. In
the legal framework, for the management of groundwater in India, there
are no de jure rights to groundwater; de facto, all landowners have the
right to the groundwater in their land. Thus, groundwater is viewed
essentially as an add-on to the land. As a consequence, there is no limit
to the amount of groundwater a landowner can extract from his land. 
Concerned at the critical situation with regard to groundwater the
Supreme Court constituted the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) as
Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA) to regulate and control ground
water management and its indiscriminate boring. The authority has
assessed that 310 out of 5711 blocks in the country have reached a
critical situation where the rate of withdrawal is more than the rate of
replenishment and another 160 blocks are approaching such a situation.
The authority has further declared several regions as notified areas for
the protection and preservation of ground water resources. In such
areas, extraction of ground water without prior approval of the authority
has been prohibited. The authority has also organised mass awareness
campaigns at various locations in India.
Another problem related to groundwater is the pollution and
contamination of aquifers due to over-exploitation, see page of sewer
lines, disposal of chemical effluents in natural watercourses, salinity
ingress in coastal areas and natural formation of arsenic, fluoride and
iron. It is difficult to restore ground water quality once the aquifer is
contaminated. The CGWB is mandated to develop cost effective
technologies like solar stills for purifying contaminated groundwater.
It is pertinent to point out here that development and monitoring
of ground water needs to be done at the local level since it is the local
people who use it. The cost of monitoring and generating information by
a central agency like the CGWB / CGWA on groundwater at the local
level is higher than a local level institution like panchayat in villages or
municipalities towns and cities. Moreover, ground water development
plans need to be coordinated and integrated with watershed
development plans which should have a specific component of ground
water recharge by developing check dams. However, the watershed
development programmes are planned and implemented by several
central and state agencies
9 who function independently from the CGWB/
CGWA. Further, at the district level there are advisory committees and at33
the village level too there are committees but there is no mechanism to
coordinate among the plethora of actors and institutions. Ironically, there
is an institutional disjunction or vacuum in spite of the existence of
several institutions.
Surface water and Irrigation: India's irrigation system is not
performing anywhere near optimum capacity. The irrigation efficiencies
are notoriously low, at around 35 percent. A number of projects suffer
from time and cost over-runs for want of adequate financial resources for
completion.  The completed projects are in a poor state of maintenance
as the emphasis is on new projects rather than properly maintaining the
existing ones. The consequence of such a poor state of maintenance
has resulted in three-fold increase in waterlogged area, from 7 million
hectares in 1976 to 23 million hectares in 2000.
In order to utilise the capacity created by the irrigation structure,
the Command Area Development Programme (CADP) was launched in
1974–75 by the water resources ministry of the central government. It
was found in the evaluation studies of the ministry that the progress
made in the construction of field channels was inadequate due to lack of
funds. It seems difficult to carry on this programme without the
involvement of the stakeholders like water users’ association and private
sector participation. The private sector has kept away from irrigation
projects due to high unit cost of development (US $ 2200/ hectare), high
gestation lag and the attitude of irrigators who are often not used to
treating irrigation as a commercial service.
The Participatory Irrigation Management Scheme administered
by the Irrigation Department of state governments will be effective in
easing the resource crunch being faced by the CADP. There is a lot of
merit in coordinating the two programmes since they overlap in the same
space, as also they will promote mutual accountability between the water
users’ association and the irrigation department
The CADP also envisaged integrated and coordinated
development of irrigated areas along with on farm development.
However, coordination failure between the Agricultural Department of the
states which provided extension support services for on farm
development and Water Resources Ministry which developed the
command area resulted in a mismatch between the place and time
where the extension service and irrigation was provided. 34
Features of Decentralisation
 Watershed Development and Tank Irrigation:  One of the most
undesirable features of development is that the traditions of water
harvesting and tank irrigation have shown a decline in the states. Neither
the government nor the people have taken any initiative to preserve
them. While the central and state governments have focused
construction of big dams and large networks of irrigation, people have
resorted to measures like groundwater mining through tube wells (e.g.
Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra,  Andhra Pradesh).  According to Iyer (2003) it
may not be easy to revitalise these structures since the land use pattern
has changed irreversibly. A more comprehensive watershed
development approach is called for rejuvenating the local systems. With
the constitutional recognition accorded to rural and urban local
governments in the 73
rd and 74
th amendment to the constitution, the local
bodies have been empowered to maintain such structures. There has
also been a realisation about the utility and sustainability of small locally
managed water-harvesting systems with involvement of the people at the
local level.
The paradigm of watershed development was initiated in India in
the 1970s in the state of Haryana due to scarcity of water. Subsequently
such local level initiatives were replicated in the states of Mahrashtra,
Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Studies have shown that that most of
these initiatives have led to an increase in water availability and a
noticeable increase in agricultural production (Iyer, 2003). The water
harvesting structures also contributed to water recharge to the ground
water aquifers that enhanced the availability of drinking water. The
incidence of benefit varied across groups, most benefits accrued to the
landed class with large land holdings, benefits to landless labourers and
cattle grazers were not direct and assured. There is also an element of
capture by the local elite even in this paradigm of development. A recent
study based on primary data in the states of Karnataka and Uttaranchal
has found that the local elite has benefited more than the poor
(Rajashekar, 2004).
The country has begun to take rainwater harvesting and
groundwater recharge seriously at all levels under the massive
integrated watershed development programme. Trends during the 1990s35
also suggest a progressive shift of budgetary allocation from irrigation
development to water harvesting and recharge.  Across India, some 6.2
million hectares of rain-fed lands are currently under treatment through
5,200 micro-watersheds at a whopping cost of Rs 8 billion (200 million $)
for the year 2001-2002. 
 Water Users Association:  In India disappointing performances
of government owned and operated irrigation systems mainly owing to
poor cost recoveries have compelled a number of states like
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh to transfer rights and responsibilities
for management of irrigation systems from government agencies to
private or local persons or organisations. Transferring responsibilities
has come to be seen as a way to reduce pressures on thinly stretched
government finances while at the same time improving irrigated
agricultural production and ensuring the long term sustainability of
irrigation systems (Geijer et. al., 1996; Vermillion, 1991). The intention is
to encourage local initiative to take responsibility for the management of
resources in the belief that beneficiaries have greater stake and better
information for making efficient resource allocations (Brewer et. al.,
1997).  Some states like Karnataka and Maharashtra, have formulated a
clearly defined and codified policy, called participatory management, of
promoting transfer of irrigation management responsibilities from the
government to farmers. 
Preliminary results indicate that, in the proper environments,
participatory management increases efficiency of water use and the
value of irrigated agricultural production.  However, benefits accrue
mostly to the elite and the whole system is managed and operationalised
by this group.
Water Pollution
Waste Disposal in Rivers:  Waste disposal in rivers is a big
problem in India. As an illustrative case, we take the river Yamuna on
which the capital city of Delhi is located. Delhi discharges more than two
thousand million litres per day (mld) of wastewater into Yamuna river. Of
this about 300 mld is contributed by the industrial sector and a bulk of the
pollutant comes from the untreated sewage because the city
administration lacks funds to install sufficient sewage treatment facilities.
A report published by Delhi Pollution Control Committee (1993) reveals
that a mere 31.8 mld of sewage is treated sufficiently for disposal into the36
river. The sewage goes untreated into the river during machinery and
power breakdowns, in other cases badly silted plants get flooded during
rains. As a result, though Delhi covers only two percent of the length and
basin area of the river, it contributes 71 percent of the wastewater
discharged into the river! And since most of the Yamuna waters that flow
into the city are used up to cater to Delhi’s requirements, what remains of
the river after Delhi is undiluted sewage. Asphyxiation of Yamuna begins
right from the entry of the river into the city, there are 18 notorious drains
and ends up in the river at various points along the 22 km. stretch
through Delhi. Industrial waste from Delhi’s industries flow through these
drains. By the time the river leaves Delhi the water is not fit for even
bathing. The situation is worse during summer. The average annual flow
in Yamuna is estimated to be about 100 billion kilolitres of which 80
percent is during the three monsoon months. With very little water
flowing through it during the other months, the assimilation capacity of
the river is considerably reduced − the river dies and turns into sewage
flow channel.
The story of Yamuna is not unique; in fact, the entire river
system in India is grossly polluted. Industries, municipal corporations,
government agencies and almost everyone is responsible for polluting
the river system. There is consciousness about polluted rivers and
several laws have been enacted to provide legal backing for cleaning up
the system. The Ganga Action Plan (to reduce pollution in the Ganges
and its tributaries) and Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was launched in 1984
and 1991 respectively. However, several studies conducted by National
Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) and Indian
Institute of Technology point out that these Action Plans have not really
reduced the level of pollution in the rivers (Shyam Divan and Armin
Rosencranz, 2001).
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VII. Environmental Regulation: Controlling Urban
Air Pollution
The living conditions of millions of urban population are such that
they pose a threat to their health and have potentially catastrophic social
consequences. For the urban poor, living conditions are the worst.37
Burgeoning urban population beyond the carrying capacity of the
different components of urban eco-systems, coupled with indifferent
urban governance, are the root causes for urban environmental
problems. The blood lead levels of persons in Ahmedabad, Bombay, and
Calcutta have been reported to be higher than the corresponding levels
of persons in lead-free gasoline areas.  In most of the cities, the SPM
levels are significantly higher than the CPCB standards. 
The deterioration in air quality in most Indian cities has led to an
intense search for ways of controlling pollution. Tentative estimates of
health costs of urban air pollution in India is US $ 1.4 billion (Brandon
and Hommann, 1995).
11 Vehicular emission is a major source of air
pollution. For example, in Delhi, where health incidences and cost of air
pollution is the highest in India, contribution of vehicles to the daily
emission level is also the highest.
Control of air pollution has to factor in to the growth in the number
of vehicles, congestion, poor quality of roads, and quality of fuel used in
vehicles. Though the history of legislation for maintenance of air quality
starts with the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, it was
the  Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986 that prescribed emission
standards for vehicles for the first time.  The prescribed standards
pertained to the emission of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons.  The
act proposed to implement the standards in 1992.  The responsibility of
enforcing these standards was vested in the Ministry of Surface
Transport (MoST).
In 1989, the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 was amended and the
Idle Emission Regulation was enacted.  In April 1990, these rules were
notified to vehicle owners.  The rules made it mandatory to obtain a
certificate of fitness for registration of public, commercial, and private
vehicles older than 15 years.  The rules also required all motor vehicles
to comply with the laid down emission standards and obtain a certificate
of ‘pollution under control’ (PUC). However, the whole system of issuing
the certificates needs more credibility and accountability, as a result the
maintenance of vehicles in most cases is very poor specially in relation
to pollution control. The certification authorities need to involve
stakeholders like Resident Welfare Associations in the urban localities
where such problems exist. At present the PUC certification is being
carried out by the motor vehicle inspectorate, know as Regional38
Transport Offices (RTOs) attached to the transport department in each
state. 
In 1991, Mass Emission Regulation was introduced. The
legislation laid down emission standards of pollutants under specified
driving conditions for vehicle manufacturers as well as for in-use
vehicles. The emission rates of vehicles were checked during mass
emission tests.  In 1995, fitment of catalytic converters (CAT) for cars in
the four metros was made compulsory. The mass emission standards
were tightened in 1996 to improve the effectiveness in producing the
desired result.  Evaporative Emission and Crank Case Emission
Regulation was introduced and emission limits of CO, HC and NOx were
lowered.
Intervention of the Judiciary
Introduction of strict norms by the administration of the Union
Territory of Delhi did not make any difference in controlling vehicular
pollution.  The quality of air continued to deteriorate in Delhi, citizens
found the pollution unbearable with eye and lung problem increasing
sharply around mid-nineties. On July 28, 1998, in response to a public
interest litigation, the Supreme Court of India ruled that all eight-year-old
buses and pre-1990 three-wheelers and taxis would have to be
converted to use compressed natural gas (CNG) by March 31, 2000. For
the remaining buses, three-wheelers and taxis, March 31, 2001 was
fixed as a deadline. This order, however, was difficult to implement.
However, the Supreme Court took a strong stand and forced the Delhi
Administration to implement the programme of converting the diesel run
buses to use CNG fuel and despite strong opposition by various lobbies
and reluctance of the government, the programme had to be
implemented. Thus the judiciary, instead of the executive, took the onus
of implementing pollution control measures.
In May 1999, the Supreme Court of India directed that Euro-I
emission norms would be effective for the National Capital Region (NCR)
for registration of all private (non-commercial) vehicles with effect from
June 1, 1999 and Euro-II norms with effect from April 1, 2000.  The apex
court passed these directives after detailed consideration of various
options recommended by the Environmental Pollution Authority (EPA).
Following the Supreme Court directives, India 2000 norms were
formulated in the year 2000.  These norms are significantly tighter than
the mass emission standards of 1996.  India 2000 norms are at least39
Euro-I equivalent for all four-wheelers, Euro-II equivalent for non-
commercial four-wheelers in the NCR (also referred to as Bharat Stage
II), and are among the tightest norms in the world for two-wheelers. 
 It has been proposed by an inter ministerial task force committee
to review the feasibility of Euro III emission norms for mega cities after
2005. A CPCB committee comprising representatives from refineries,
research institutes like Indian Institute of Petroleum, ministries of Industry
and Petroleum recommended a road map for the implementation of
emission norms covering major cities and the whole country.
VIII. Failure of the Executive and Intervention of the
Judiciary
Implementation of Pollution Regulating Laws
 The nodal agency for implementing various legislations relating
to environmental protection at the centre is the Ministry of Environment
and Forests, and the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) established
by it. At the state level, most states have set up Departments of
Environment and State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs).
The whole issue of pollution prevention and control is dealt with
mainly by command and control methods.  Voluntary regulations, fiscal
instruments, and education and promotional measures are also being
focused upon.   In the command and control methods, the standards are
determined and enforced by the central and state pollution control
boards. The boards have implemented a pollution control programme
whereby a total of 1551 large and medium units have been identified in
the country under the 17 highly polluting industrial sectors. Such
programmes need continuous monitoring until the target is attained. In
order to encourage industries to manufacture their products in an
environment friendly manner the CPCB has introduced an ECOMARK
scheme to help the consumers to identify such products.   As regards
fiscal instruments, although the Tax Reform Committee in 1991
recommended excise taxes for dealing with externalities, the main focus40
of fiscal instruments has been to generate revenue rather than
controlling pollution or conserving scarce resources.
Thus, despite the legislative and administrative efforts and fiscal
incentives for pollution control, ambient standards of air and water
pollution continue to be routinely exceeded and in some areas the quality
has even deteriorated (Mehta, Mundle, and Sankar, 1996). This is
attributable to the hiatus between the macro goals of our environmental
policy and the micro nature of operational provisions for enforcement of
the policy. Hence, though standards have been laid down for ambient air
and water quality, actual enforcement relates mostly to some source
emission standards laid down for individual polluters. Furthermore, the
ambient and source standards are laid down independently, and
unrelated in terms of the volume of polluting activities. Hence, it is quite
conceivable that the quality of the environment may continue to
deteriorate in spite of compliance by individual polluters. Additionally, the
degree of compliance may also be poor.
Determination of Standards
The CPCB has stipulated baseline standards and the SPCBs
can prescribe more stringent standards depending on the particular
desires and requirements.  There are three types of effluent standards
for the purpose of discharge of effluents.  These are concentration-based
standards, equipment-based standards, and load or mass-based
standards. The issue however, is not with the prescription of standards,
but with their implementation.  Often, an instance of dynamic instability in
intergovernmental competition arises from laxity in implementing
environmental standards. 
Questions may be raised about the basis for setting standards
and their relevance of the standard to surrounding ecosystem. According
to Sankar (1999), determination of standards should be done on the
basis of detailed cost benefit analysis. The standard setting in India does
not give any chance to the polluters or the citizens to voice their opinion.
The standards in India are set on the basis of industry studies
undertaken by scientific and technical institutions appointed by the
CPCB. These studies provide estimates of pollution emission and
abatement cost subject to the various limitations that are inherent in such
exercises. These standards are often replicated identically from those
existing in different parts of the world without testing their relevance to41
the Indian situation. Another issue at the implementation level is whether
a nation-wide uniform effluent standard is desirable. The carrying
capacity and the trade-off between environmental quality and growth are
determined and influenced by regional specificity. The standards,
therefore, should vary with regions. However, fixing standards according
to regional specificity may lead to the states lowering the standard to
attract investment, eventually degenerating into a pollution haven. To
prevent this tendency the Environment Protection Act, 1986 gives
powers to the central and state governments to restrict or prohibit certain
activities in ecologically fragile areas. The rules do not permit any state
governments or SPCBs to lower the standards fixed by the central
government in any region. The problem of implementation is,
nevertheless, critical.
It may be pertinent to mention here that in 1988 the water act
was amended to strengthen the implementation provisions. Now, the
state boards can close a defaulting unit, the penalties are also raised and
a citizen’s initiative provision bolsters the enforcement machinery. In the
industrialised state of Gujarat, a resolution was adopted in the legislature
under Article 252 not to introduce the 1988 amendments thus continuing
to allow the industries to pollute land and water-bodies. However, in
1995 this came to the notice of the Supreme Court when a writ petition
was filed by a farmer against large-scale pollution of a canal called
Kharicut. The court took a tough stand to implement the provisions of law
and a cleaning operation which included closure, and fines. The
construction of a pipeline to carry industrial waste water to effluent
treatment plants was carried on for four year; these plans were
implemented under the strict supervision of the High Court. This example
clearly brings out that there is a big gap between the existence of law
and its implementation.   Similar instances have been reported from
Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra (Shyam Divan and Armin Rosencranz,
2001). It may also be pointed out here that monitoring and enforcement
through local level institutions will be much more effective in checking
such pollution, the absence of delegation of power to such institutions
forms the basis of executive failure and intervention by the judiciary.
Enforcement of Standards 
In India poor enforcement of laws/rules occurs owing to
unreliable information pertaining to quantities of effluents/emissions/solid42
wastes and their characteristics. There is information asymmetry since
polluters know more about the sources, magnitudes, and concentration
of pollutants as well as cost of controlling pollution than the regulators. It
is very difficult for the regulating agencies to acquire and process
information from thousands of units dispersed in their domain. The
regulating agencies complain about “thin spread of institutions”  for
controlling pollution vis-a-vis the enormous spread of industrial units,
thus making them very weak.
12 The SPCBs suffer from acute resource
constraints. They do not have adequate technical facilities and skilled
personnel for monitoring the polluting units on even filing charges against
them for violating standards. The amount of fines imposed is too less
and is independent of the extent of violations. The courts take years to
settle such cases owing to pendency of large number of other cases,
causing the dispute settlement mechanism ineffective.  Penalties such as
imprisonment of officials, stoppage of water and electricity, and closure
of units can impose hardships on the affected firms, but in a weak
enforcement regime with the principal agent problem, collusion between
regulators and the regulated units is common. As the cost of compliance
upto the prescribed standards increases rapidly, with the extent of
violation, non-compliance is a cheaper option than compliance for many
polluters. Since dispute settlement by going to courts are time
consuming and costly, it gives the regulating officers an opportunity to
indulge in rent seeking activities.  Besides, the state governments can
intervene and influence the decisions of the SPCBs.  Even though the
SPCBs are supposed to be autonomous, they depend upon the state
government for financial support and the members owe their positions to
political patronage. Green rating, environmental audit, local community
pressures etc. provide one mechanism for altering polluters’ behaviour
and bring pressure on government. This policy may work for large units,
firms listed in stock markets or highly localised pollution. It is important
that cost effectiveness of alternative options in framing of regulations,
prescription of standards, and enforcement of rules should be accepted
as a policy goal. The cost benefit analysis should be made mandatory in
framing and enforcing environmental regulations.
Intervention of Judiciary
The inability to enforce environmental legislation has often led to
affected parties, NGOs and the general public, taking recourse to legal
action, mostly in the form of public interest litigations.  This is aided by43
the fact that the courts have interpreted the fundamental right to life and
personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the constitution to include the
right to enjoy pollution free air and water.   
Public Interest Litigation in India: Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in
India is working on the planned rules evolved by the Supreme Court
through the various decisions pronounced by it. The need for a PIL was
felt by the Supreme Court when it reckoned the fact that large number of
people in India are suffering silently in matters relating to their
fundamental rights due to poverty, illiteracy and remoteness from the
centre of power. The remedy available to citizens to go to the courts for
the enforcement of the right to life under Article 21 and the growing
environmental problems and consciousness has radically changed the
situation in India. Some of the important PILs are mentioned below.
(i)  Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs State of Uttar
Pradesh
13:  This case is said to be the harbinger of the new trend
of PILs. The Supreme Court directed the closure of mining
operation in the limestone quarries of Doon valley located in the
foothills of the Himalayas when it found that it was creating
ecological imbalance and was a health hazard to the local
population. It held that although closure would cause hardship to
the affected parties, it was necessary for protecting and
safeguarding the rights of the people to live in a healthy
environment and ensure ecological balance. It further directed
that the affected areas be restored by afforestation and soil
conservation programme to provide employment opportunities to
the affected workers (Shyam Divan and Armin Rosencranz
2001).
(ii)  M.C.Mehta vs Union of India
14: The Supreme Court directed the
stopping of the working of tanneries discharging effluents in the
Ganges river if they did not set up primary effluent treatment
plants. It held that financial incapacity of the tanners to set up
effluent treatment plants was irrelevant.
(iii)  M.C.Mehta vs Union of India 
15: The Supreme Court ordered the
closing down of a chlorine plant of Shriram Industries after the
oleum gas leak case. This case was decided by a five judge
constitutional bench due to the gravity of the legal question
under consideration. In this case the court ruled that there is
absolute liability on hazardous industries.44
(iv)  Indian Council for Envirolegal action vs Union of India
16: In this
case the Supreme Court ordered remedial action and
compensation to the people affected by lethal waste left for years
after chemical industries were closed. The compensation was in
line with absolute liability principle.
(v)  In its order on a PIL related to dumping of hazardous and
noxious material by industrial units throughout India filed by
Research Foundation for Science, a NGO, the Supreme Court
issued a direction to the Union ministry for environment and
forests to take the necessary steps within a specified time frame.
The Supreme Court warned the ministry that if the top officers
concerned did not measure upto their duties and enforce the
provisions of the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the court
would be constrained to record a “judicial finding of failure to
perform their duties against them”.  The court also threatened
that the judicial finding will be recorded in their service records.
Some other important decisions of the supreme court are: (i)
closure of 69 foundries in Howrah, in West Bengal state for their failure
to install pollution control devices in 1996; (ii) closure of 39,000 illegal
industrial units operating in residential areas in Delhi and shifting 513 of
them to locations outside the city for causing health damage to citizens;
(iii) closing of aquaculture farms within 500 metres of the sea coast in
1997; (iv) shifting 550 tanneries located in East Calcutta in 1997 and
setting up of a environmental pollution fund with each unit paying
Rs. 10,000 as fine to be used for cleaning up the river Hoogly on the
banks of which the tanneries were located; and (v) ban on felling of trees
and ruling that the running of saw mills of any kind, including veneer and
plywood mills was prima facie, a violation of the provisions of the Forest
Conservation Act of 1980.
As PIL cases began crowding the court docket, often in the form
of skimpy petitions based on newspaper reports, several problems are
cropping up in relation to securing detailed facts, receiving experts
opinion on complex social and scientific issues, and ensuring  continuous
supervision of judicial orders. Sometimes the official machinery is
unreliable, slow and biased, and unable to provide impartial assessment
of facts. On such occasions the court can appoint special commissions
to gather facts and data. With regard to complex scientific issues, the
Supreme Court most often relies on the National Environment
Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), Nagpur. Sometimes to ease the45
burden of evidence, the court may resort to a judicial notice of “facts”.
For example in a petition seeking to reduce pollution in river Ganges, the
Supreme Court dispensed with the need for hard scientific fact on the
health effects of pollution and the damage it caused to riparian property.
The Supreme Court went through certain books and writings and simply
assumed that such injuries had occurred or were likely to occur and
proceeded to issue remedial action.
Frequently, environmental cases need independent scientific
expertise for decision making. On such occasions the judges appoint a
committee of experts to probe scientific questions and advise the court
on the course of action. Like special commissions, the expert committees
are appointed under the inherent powers of the courts under Article 32
and 226 of the constitution. The court treats the opinion of such
committees with great reverence since they are eminent scientists drawn
from leading institutions.
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The flip side of PIL is that it may be construed as ingress into
fields traditionally reserved for the executive. An example may be the
Dehradun Quarrying Case where the Supreme Court resolved the
development policy which included conserving nature, preserving jobs
and protecting substantial business investments while deciding to close a
number of limestone quarries in the Mussoorie Hills and allow others to
operate under detailed conditions. The problem relates to the
competence of the court to review highly technical reports of various
experts when they differ in their diagnosis and conclusions.
Enforcement of environmental law through the courts has
advantages as well as pitfalls. The judge who presided over the Ganges
pollution case had to persistently cajole and drive recalcitrant industries
and public authorities in the Ganges basin to comply with pollution
norms. The polluting units included hundreds of large polluting industries
in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, municipal
corporations, the Eastern Railways, giant thermal power plants,
numerous small industries, and tanneries. The first task of the court was
to identify the polluters for which it turned to the lawyer who filed the PIL.
Once identified, all units were issued orders to meet effluent standards
within three months or else face closure. To emphasise the urgency, the
orders threatening closure were issued without giving due hearing to the
companies. The court directed the state pollution control boards to serve
the notice without any loss of time. The units had to report to the boards.46
When the units reached the prescribed discharge levels the boards were
directed by the court to inspect the working of the emission treatment
plants. The court was clearly unhappy with the performance of the
pollution control boards and regretted that the SPCBs could not perform
even an elementary function. The widespread impression was that court
orders were misused by the dishonest board officials to seek rent. The
court finally entrusted the National Environmental Engineering Institute to
perform the job.
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Public interest litigation and judicial activism has been extremely
effective in India in dealing with the problems of executive failure, which
have been so rampant in matters of environmental concerns. In many
senses the courts provide a remedy to massive bureaucratisation and a
very non-transparent, nebulous, ineffective and corrupt administrative
structure of state and central governments. Environmental conservation
in India without the interference of the courts would have been in a state
of a shambles. The judicial activism has been an effective remedy for
administrative and executive failures. It has brought about a sense of
accountability and responsibility in the otherwise lax bureaucracy. This
has been an important part of “checks and balances” in Indian
federalism.
While the judicial intervention has been an effective check
against executive failure, excessive intervention could result in taking
over the functions of the executive by the courts and in such cases, there
is no remedy for the wrong decisions.  The Supreme Court’s attempt to
solve the environmental regulation through judicial pronouncements is
certainly praiseworthy, but it basically highlights the failure of the
executive to enforce environmental laws and regulations.  The reluctance
of the executive in environmental regulation is not due to the assignment
system itself, nor can it be attributed to unstable intergovernmental
competition, but seems to arise from asymmetric information and
structure of incentives leading to rent seeking behaviour of the
regulators. Judicial activism cannot be a satisfactory solution to
executive failure for, judicial intervention can at best be ad hoc solutions
and by itself, it does not help to evolve a rule-based system of
environmental governance. 
One problem with the judicial decisions is that the court
approaches the problem purely from the angle of ‘right’. Some of its
decisions relating to water pollution are not implementable. In AIR 198047
SC 1622 (Ratlam vs. Vardhichand), the court held that the budget
constraints did not absolve a municipality from providing sanitation
facilities. It compelled the municipality to implement a sanitation scheme.
Most of the local bodies do not have the resources to set up and operate
sewerage systems or provide water treatment. Even in executive
decisions relating to the prescription of standards, the costs of
implementation, or the existence of cost-effective technologies etc. are
not considered.
Besides, while the Supreme Court has shown keenness to deal
with environmental issues, the lower courts have been extremely
reluctant to take up environmental cases.  There is also a serious
problem of corruption in lower courts, which may not yield satisfactory
solutions.
19   Another serious problem with environmental protection laws
in India is that they come under criminal laws and not civil laws. This is
the reason the laws and the court consider violation or no violation and
not the extent of violation. Thus, in the Indian context, more than the
assignment of environmental function between different levels of
government, the problems have centred around implementation and the
overlapping roles of executive and judiciary.
IX. Concluding Remarks
This paper deals with the assignment system and
implementation mechanism relating to the environmental functions in
India.  It analyses the effectiveness of  environmental governance in the
country by examining forest, water, and air.  It analyses the system of
assignments, problems arising from the overlapping assignments,
bargaining, and dispute resolution mechanisms in regard to the three
elements.  It also analyses the implementation aspects of environmental
policy to examine the effectiveness of policies and institutions relating to
environmental governance.
The assignment of environmental power in Indian federalism is
reasonably clear.   Broadly, while the central government has the
responsibility of determining the overall policy frame, the subnational
governments are involved in implementation.  Thus, the assignment48
system attempts to minimise transaction costs by providing sufficient
scope for decentralised governance of environmental functions.  At the
same time, the central government has overriding powers to avoid
unstable competition and institute mechanisms to resolve inter-state
disputes.
 
In implementing environmental regulations, particularly with
regard to the protection of forests and management of water systems,
decentralised solutions involving participatory approaches have shown
promise.  The institutions of JFM and village forest committees have
enhanced the stake of the local population in the development of
forestry.  Similarly, the water users’ associations have helped in
improved maintenance of irrigation canals.  Instances of successful
decentralised approach can also be found in rainwater harvesting and
watershed development.  However, decentralised solutions may also
lead to elite capture unless adequate safeguards are taken. 
The implementation of environmental functions has been a major
concern. In most cases, a critical factor impeding effective
implementation is the structure of incentives to bureaucracy and policy
makers and influence of polluters on them.  Besides, the environmental
regulators do not have access to modern technology to measure and
regulate pollution levels, and the resources in their possession are
inadequate.
Although the assignment of environmental functions to different
levels of government seems to be satisfactory, there is considerable
overlap between the roles of executive and judiciary in the enforcement
of environmental regulation.  Often, we see the executive failure in
environmental regulation leading to the intervention by the Supreme
Court.  Interpreting that access to clean water and air as a fundamental
right, the courts have pronounced several judgements on the
implementation of environmental regulation, often, taking over the role of
the executive. This has helped to resolve issues in the short term and in
some cases has led to improvement in environmental quality, it is
important to avoid ad hoc and arbitrary solutions.  There is also the
problem of capacity of the Supreme Court to take into account changes
in technology.  In other words, replacement of executive action through
judicial activism cannot be a satisfactory solution to environmental
regulation.  This calls for reform of the incentive structure and institutions49
of governance to make the executive much more sensitive and
accountable to environmental issues.
The paper has also analysed the issues of inter-state river water
disputes.  The conclusion of the paper is that effective resolution
mechanism for Inter-state river water dispute simply does not exist.  The
ruling governments at the centre have simply used the disputes for their
short-term political gains. Neither the tribunals, nor the Supreme Court
order has ensured compliance by the parties to the dispute nor do they
have the potential to provide effective solution to the problem.  The river
water dispute has become highly emotive and threatens the very federal
fabric of the country.   52
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 The province of Alberta in Canada, for example, gets much of its revenues from
oil resources and does not impose the retail sales tax on its citizens.
2  The words “union” and “centre” are used interchangeably in this paper.
3  There are also other acts with implications on environmental regulations.
These include, Factories Act, 1948 which mandates the treatment of liquid
effluents, gases and fumes generated during production process before disposal
and the Insecticides Act of 1968, which regulates all aspects of use of pesticides
including the monitoring of insecticides residue in the environment. There are
also other acts related to the environment such as, The Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act of 1954, The River Boards Act of 1956, The Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act of 1957, The Ancient Monuments and
Archaeological Sites and Remains Act of 1958, and The Atomic Energy Act of
1962.
4 It may be noted that the PIL on air pollution pertained to local issues though
filed in the national court.
5 This section has been compiled on the basis of information available at the
website of Ministry of Environment Forest, URL: www.envfor.nic.in/, Water
Resources Ministry URL: wrmin.nic.in/, and  Sustainable Development Network
Programming of National Informatics Center URL: www.sdnp.delhi.nic.in/, and
The Energy and Resource Institute URL: www,teriin.org.
6 The programmes implemented by the Ministry of Agricultural and Co-operation
are National Watershed Development Projects for Rainfed Areas, watershed
Development Projects in Shifting Cultivation Areas, Integrated Watershed
Development Projects,  The  Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh Watershed
Development Projects, and the watershed projects at Tirunelveli,
Ramnathapuram and Koraput.
7 The programmes under the Ministry are Desert Development Programme,
Drought Prone Area Programme, Integrated Watershed Development
Programme which carries out water resources development activities including
checking dams and water harvesting structures.
8 A.J.James (2003) Institutional Challenges for Water Resource Management:
India and South Africa WHIRL Project Working Paper 7 URL: www.nri.org/WSS-
IWRM/reports.htm
9 Ministry of Rural Development, and Ministry of Environment and Forest of the
Central Government, Ministry of Panchayati Raj and Rural Development,
Irrigation Departments of State Governments.
10 We shall come back to the issue of water pollution with respect to its
regulation, enforcement of standards and institutions in the subsequent sections.
We discuss issues related to air pollution in the next section so that the common
institutions which enforce pollution related regulations can be analysed with
respect to both air and water pollution.51
                                                                                                                                 
11 Brandon, Carter and Kristen Hommann, 1995 The Cost of Inaction: Valuing the
Economy-wide Cost of Environmental Degradation in India, Asia Environment
Division, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
12 The total strength of employees of Pollution Control Board in India is 600 as
compared to 17000 in USEPA
13 A.I.R. 1985 SC 652
14 A.I.R. 1987 SC 965, 1086 and 1988 S.C.1037 and 1135
15 A.I.R. 1987 SC 1086
16 A.I.R.1996 SC 1037
17 The Supreme Court accepted the Shekhar Singh Committee recommendations
which was appointed by it to look into matters related to saving the fragile
ecosystem of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in spite of heavy opposition from
a number of quarters.
18 Compiled from newspaper reports of Times of India and The Hindu
19 The Chief Justice lamented in public of his inability to prevent rampant
corruption in the lower courts due to lack of effective power.  See, Times of India,
February 13, 2004.